THE DOCTRINE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS IN COURT PROCESSES: ANALYSIS OF FIRST BANK V. OBONG-IFIOK | WHO SIGNS COURT DOCUMENTS? SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES RULE ON STATUTORY STIPULATIONS || Lydia Ehisuoria Ohonsi, Esq.

FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V. OBONG-IFIOK (DR.) ANNY ASIKPO (TRADING UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF ABBY EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS) (2025) 16 NWLR (Pt. 2012) 473

- On whether the court can impose the duty of signing the court process on another person where the rule of court expressly stipulates who to sign -

The Latin maxim expressio unius еst exclusio аlterius means thе express mention of оnе thing is the exclusion of another. Where а rule of court has expressly stipulated who is to sign а document, such as a registrar, the law cannot be amended by implication to insert another person, such as a legal practitioner, into that statutory responsibility. The province of interpretation is not for rewriting procedural codes.

[S.L.B. Consortium Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 referred to and distinguished.] (Pp. 495-495, paras. C-H)

Per ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. at pages 495-497, paras. D-C:

“It is also necessary to underscore that the decisions in SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (supra) and Okafor v. Nweke (supra), on which the appellant placed heavy reliance, are distinguishable from the present case. In the SLB Consortium, this court was called upon to interpret Order 26 rule 4(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2000, where he sues in person. This provision was clearly absent in the Edict No. 24 of 1989 of the Akwa Ibom High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules under which the respondent had instituted his action, and subsequently sought and obtained an amendment to the writ. The 1989 Civil Procedure Rules only made provisions that a writ of summons is valid if signed by a Registrar or other authorised officer of the court which was applicable in the respondent’s case at the trial court. Whether or not the writ of summons is valid will depend on when it was filed and the Rules of Court governing it at the material time.”

- On whether the court can impose the duty of signing the court process on another person where the rule of court expressly stipulates who to sign -

[S.L.B. Consortium Ltd. v. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 referred to and distinguished.] (Pp. 495-495, paras. C-H)

Per ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. at pages 495-497, paras. D-C:

“The complain of the respondent in the preliminary objection is that the originating processes in this action were not signed by a person known to law contrary to the provisions of Order 26 rule 4(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000, Sections 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act (supra) and the decision of this court in Okafor v. Nweke (supra) by which the respondent is understood as contending that the case, as instituted “was not initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. In Order 26 rule 4(3) supra, it is provided thus: “Pleadings shall be signed by a legal practitioner or by the party if he sues or defends in person.”

The above provision is very clear and unambiguous. Looking at the originating summons and the amended statement of claim complained of, it is very clear that both were signed by “Adewale Adesokan & Co.” and that the said “Adewale Adesokan & Co.” - is not a party to the action. Is “Adewale Adesokan & Co.” a legal practitioner to come under the provisions of the above order?

To answer that question we have to go to the Legal Practitioners Act, Section 24 of which defines a Legal Practitioner.

“Legal practitioner means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister and solicitor either generally or for the purposes of any particular office or proceedings.”

So a legal practitioner contemplated by Order 26 rule 4(3) supra is the one defined above. Is “Adewale Adesokan & Co.” a legal practitioner within the context of Order 26 rule 4(3) supra? Learned counsel for the appellant contends that it is, a law firm of a sole proprietor, while the objection is to the contrary. This takes us to the decision of this court in Cole v. Martins (supra), which learned counsel says is his authority for the above proposition. It is clear from the facts of this case that there is no evidence on record that Mr. Adewale Adesokan, who is a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll, is the only legal practitioner practising law under that trade name. Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act clearly states that “subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the roll.”

No such provision as in Order 26 rule 4(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000 exists in Order 5 rule 15 of the 1989 Rules applicable herein. The clear mischief those authorities, including SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (supra) and a host of other decisions, sought to cure - the impersonal and legally impermissible signature by law firms - does not arise here. What we have before us is not a faceless law firm to represent a party, but a writ that bears the name of a clearly identified legal practitioner, though unsigned by him. Critically, it is not the authenticity of authorship that is in doubt there, but the existence of a legal obligation to sign at all.

Courts do not set traps for litigants or counsel by penalising them for failing to do what the rules do not require. To adopt the appellant’s view would be to supplant the law with an expost facto obligation, thereby rendering void that which was lawful at the time it was done. That is a jurisprudential hearsay this court must not condone.”

LYDIA EHISUORIA OHONSI, Esq.

October, 2025.